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Summary. A mutual link between poverty and environmental degradation is ex-
amined in an overlapping generations model with environmental externality, hu-
man capital, and credit constraints. Environmental quality affects labor productiv-
ity and thus wealth dynamics, whereas wealth distribution determines the degree
to which agents rely upon natural resources and therefore the evolution of envi-
ronmental quality. This interaction creates a ‘poverty-environment trap,’ where a
deteriorated environment lowers income, which in turn accelerates environmental
degradation. We show that greater wealth heterogeneity is the key to escaping the
poverty-environment trap, although it has negative effects both on the environment
and output when not in the trap.
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1 Introduction
During the last decade, a substantial number of both empirical and case studies
have pointed out the mutual link between poverty and environmental degradation.
Poverty forces people to rely heavily on natural resources for agriculture, fisheries,
and timber production.1 However, excessive use of natural resources, such as over-
grazing, excessive fuelwood harvesting and unsustainable farming practice, is a pri-
mary cause of environmental degradation. As pointed out by Barbier (1997), poor
rural households with limited access to capital tend to extract short-term rents from
existing agricultural land, and such practices often result in land degradation, aban-
donment of existing land, and the expansion of agricultural activity into frontier
forests.2 Partly as a consequence of such exploitation, low-income countries lost
about 73 million hectares (i.e., about 8 percent) of their forest in the 1990s while
high-income countries reforested about 8 million hectares of forest in the same period
(World Bank, 2004).
Environmental degradation, in turn, results in low productivity and makes poor
households poorer. Deforestation is a major source of human-induced soil degrada-
tion in developing regions, accounting for around 40 percent of erosion in Asia and
South America (Oldeman et al. 1990).3 With reduction in land productivity, agri-
cultural income of the poor falls and the risk of undernourishment rises. Moreover,
poor households living in a degraded environment are confronted with a high possi-
bility of water-related diseases from drinking untreated water (World Bank, 2004).
In this way, a degraded environment lowers agricultural and other incomes of the
1Cavendish (2000) empirically analyzes the poverty-environment relationship in Zimbabwe and
shows that environmental resources make a significant contribution to average rural incomes, and
that poorer households are more resource dependent than are the rich.
2Barbier and Burgess (1997) show that the demand for forest conversion is negatively correlated
with income per capita. Fuelwood harvesting by the poor is also responsible for deforestation in
Peru (Swinton and Quiroz, 2003).
3Deforestation also makes fuelwood collection by the poor more time-consuming (Dasgupta,
1998).
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Figure 1: Education and Deforestation. The horizontal axis shows the average annual
deforestation rate between 1990 and 2000; the vertical axis shows the net enrollment ratio of
primary school in the 2001/02 period. Data source: World Bank (2004).
poor, which forces them to rely on natural resources more than ever, furthering the
process of environmental degradation and increasing poverty.4 This mutual link be-
tween poverty and environmental degradation creates a ‘poverty-environment’ trap,
from which the poor find it hard to emerge.
This paper presents a model that formalizes this mutual link in an overlapping
generations setting with environmental externality, human capital accumulation, and
credit constraints. While the poverty-environment trap has been described largely
in verbal terms in the literature, our model clarifies its properties by showing the
existence of two stable steady states. In particular, one steady state is characterized
by a combination of a high level of wealth, a high level of human capital investment
and a good environment, whereas the other is characterized by poverty, little or no
human capital investment, and a degraded environment. Once the economy settles
into the latter steady state, it cannot escape from the poverty-environment trap.
A key specification of our model is that technologies that intensively use human
4This ‘feedback loop’ has been pointed out by Duraiappah (1998) and Borghesi and Vercelli
(2003).
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capital are less reliant on natural resources and therefore have smaller impacts on
the environment than primitive technologies. A number of pieces of evidence are
consistent with this specification. First, an international comparison among 126 de-
veloped and developing countries shows a clear negative relationship between the
net enrollment ratio of primary school and the annual deforestation rate (see Fig-
ure 1). Second, Swinton and Quiroz (2003) show that human capital significantly
promotes the use of sustainable agricultural practices (e.g., fallowing) and reduces
the likelihood of tree felling. Torras and Boyce (1998) also report that, in low-
income countries, higher literacy rates improve environmental quality. Since only
wealthy households can afford education when credit markets are imperfect, these
environmental effects of human capital imply that higher average wealth improves
the environment, or, equivalently, that poverty causes environmental degradation.5
To complete the mechanics of the poverty-environment trap, the model also in-
corporates the fact that agents’ capacity to work depends on environmental quality.
Combined with the environmental effects of human capital, the productivity effect of
the environment creates intergenerational feedback loops. With a degraded environ-
ment, agents’ low productivity enables them to leave only small amounts of transfer
for their children, who therefore have to rely on technologies that deteriorate the
environment even more, falling into the poverty-environment trap. Conversely, when
the environment is favorable, agents receive sufficient amounts of assets from their
parents to invest in human capital out of received assets, improving the environment
for future generations. We show that the fate of an economy depends on both the
initial level of environmental quality and the initial distribution of wealth.
Poverty and the quality of the environment are often considered to be associated
with inequality. Using the model explained above, we examine the dynamic conse-
quences of distributional policies in both of the two steady states. Following Loury
5Bahamondes (2003) finds this causation in a panel data study examining how asset levels affect
the choice of agricultural practices and how those practices affected natural resource status in arid
central Chile. He concludes that the impressive recovery of a fragile natural resource is based on
rising incomes.
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(1981) and Owen and Weil (1998), we introduce heterogeneity in individuals’ ability
so that the distribution of wealth evolves over successive generations. It is shown that
the effect of inequality on environment and development is completely opposite for
the two steady states. If wealth inequality widens in the poverty trap, some wealthy
households start or increase investment in human capital whereas poor households do
not invest at all ab initio. The aggregate amount of human capital investment thus
increases, improving the quality of the environment in the economy. The improved
environment raises everyone’s productivity and income, and the wealth of households
over generations. It encourages poorer households to invest in human capital, further
improving the quality of the environment.6 Under a certain condition, this virtuous
spiral allows the economy to escape from the poverty trap to a better steady state.
It can be viewed as a particular case of the more general and abstract model of Galor
and Tsiddon (1997), who demonstrate that inequality of human capital distribution
may serve as a vehicle in the development of less-developed economies.
In the better steady state, conversely, our model shows that an appropriate level
of redistribution is beneficial both for aggregate output and for the environment:
a narrower wealth distribution lets poor households rely less on natural resources
whereas the rich are always fully investing in human capital. Those contrasting
results in the two steady states are consistent with an empirical finding by Barro
(2000) that the relationship between inequality and growth is positive for low-income
countries whereas it is negative for high-income countries.
In the literature of poverty traps, a number of theoretical studies examine the role
of wealth distribution on economic development. In those studies, multiple steady
states occur because of imperfections of credit markets combined with some noncon-
vexities in the model. Nonconvexities are usually introduced in terms of a discrete
choice being faced by agents between being uneducated or educated (Galor and Zeira,
1993; Owen and Weil, 1998); a discrete choice between exerting a fixed amount of
6This process is similar to the trickle-down mechanism of Aghion and Bolton (1997). They
consider the trickle-down process in terms of physical capital and interest rate, whereas ours is
driven by human capital and the quality of the environment.
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effort or not (Piketty, 1997); or a discrete choice between occupations (Banerjee and
Newman, 1993). A high-yielding choice typically requires agents to possess at least
a certain threshold level of wealth. Thus, agents below the threshold cannot escape
from the poverty trap where a low-yielding choice is reinforced in subsequent peri-
ods. Our model differs from these in allowing agents to choose arbitrary amounts of
investment in human capital. Rather, the obvious fact that the amount of human
capital must be nonnegative generates a convex correspondence between wealth and
investment.7 Agents with assets lower than a certain threshold level choose not to
invest at all since consumption is their urgent priority, while those with larger assets
invest according to their wealth levels. Thus, from Jensen’s inequality, a mean-
preserving spread in the distribution of wealth clearly increases the average level of
investment and hence promotes economic development, whereas the growth effect of
wealth heterogeneity is less obvious in other models where nonconvexities arise from
a discrete choice.8
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and derives the interrelated evolutions of the distribution of wealth and environmen-
tal quality. As a benchmark, Section 3 considers a representative agent economy and
demonstrates the existence of multiple steady states, one of which is characterized
as a poverty-environment trap. Heterogeneity across agents is introduced in Sec-
tion 4, where the effects of a redistributive policy on the environment and wealth
distribution are analyzed. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a discrete time model of an overlapping generations economy, where each
individual lives for two consecutive periods. Agents in their first and second periods
7Similarly, Moav (2002) obtains a convex bequest function by assuming that agents cannot leave
negative bequests.
8In fact, Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993) conclude that equality in the
initial distribution of wealth is important for economic growth.
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are called young and adult individuals, respectively, and each adult is assumed to
bear a single child (a young agent), implying that the total population is stationary.
The size of each generation is normalized to unity, with each individual of generation
t being indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] and t.
Evolution of individuals’ wealth over generations
Individuals are endowed with a certain amount of labor for both periods of their
lives. The amount of labor, or their ability to learn and work, depends on the
quality of the environment at the time of their birth.9 Let Qt ≥ 0 denote the quality
of the environment in the economy, whose evolution is explained later. The labor
endowment for each of an individual’s periods is specified by10
`j,t = Qtεj,t. (1)
In (1), εj is a random variable with mean 1, distributed independently, identically
and uniformly within [1 − σ, 1 + σ], where σ is a constant representing the degree
of variations in ability. Inclusion of random variable εj enables us to capture the
heterogeneity of agents within an economy, as in Loury (1981).
From parents, young agent j inherits bj,t units of goods, which are subject to an
inheritance tax of rate τ ∈ [0, 1]. The government revenue from the inheritance tax
is distributed equally among young agents, so that an agent’s total wealth at birth
is
wj,t = (1− τ)bj,t +
Z 1
0
τbj0,tdj0. (2)
Those goods are divisible and nonstorable. A young individual uses a part of his/her
wealth, ej,t ≥ 0, as an input for human capital investment. It is combined with
9As mentioned in the introduction, the risk of disease and malnutrition in developing countries
increases with environmental degradation. Also in industrial countries, polluted air impairs the
labor productivity of those with health problems such as asthma and bronchitis.
10We assume that an individual is endowed with the same amount of labor for each period,
implying that his/her ability to work in adulthood depends on the quality of the environment in
his/her youth. This assumption is not critical since the quality of the environment, Qt, changes
only gradually.
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his/her endowed labor `j,t to produce
hj,t+1 = γej,t`j,t (3)
units of human capital, where γ > 0 is a productivity parameter. As its subscript
shows, this human capital hj,t+1 becomes available in adulthood. We assume that
credit markets are imperfect so that an individual can neither borrow nor lend.11 It
means that the amount of human capital investment is restricted by ej,t ∈ [0, wj,t]
and that the remainder is used for an agent’s young period consumption
cyj,t = wj,t − ej,t ≥ 0. (4)
In the second period of life, the agent produces goods employing two kinds of
technology. One is the primitive technology that produces goods from labor and
natural resources according to
ypj,t+1 = a
pmin{rj,t+1, `pj,t+1}, (5)
where constant ap > 0 denotes the marginal productivity of labor and natural re-
sources, `pj,t+1 ∈ [0, `j,t] is the amount of labor used for the primitive technology out
of his/her second period endowment `j,t, and rj,t+1 ≥ 0 is the amount of natural
resources that he/she exploits without private costs.12 In equilibrium, an individual
uses exactly the same amount of rj,t+1 as `
p
j,t+1 since the additional marginal product
of natural resources is zero. Although each agent does not incur private costs, the
aggregate usage of natural resources deteriorates the quality of the environment, as
will be specified later.
The other production technology, which we call the sustainable technology, pro-
duces goods from labor and human capital according to
ysj,t+1 = a
smin{hj,t+1, `sj,t+1}, (6)
11The assumption that agents cannot save is made only for simplicity. It does not affect the
equilibrium outcomes other than the consumption profile of individuals.
12The cost of exploitation can be interpreted as being included in `pj,t+1.
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where constant as > ap denotes the marginal productivity of labor and human cap-
ital, `sj,t+1 ∈ [0, `j,t] is the amount of labor used for the sustainable technology, and
hj,t+1 is the amount of human capital accumulated through (3). This production
technology does not require natural resources, and in that sense is good for the
environment.
Subject to the time constraint, `pj,t+1+`
s
j,t+1 = `j,t, each adult agent allocates labor
so as to maximize the total output yj,t+1 = y
p
j,t+1 + y
s
j,t+1. The latter can be written
as yj,t+1 = a
p(`j,t − `sj,t+1) + asmin{hj,t+1, `sj,t+1}, since substituting rj,t+1 = `pj,t+1
into (5) shows that the output from the primitive technology is ap`pj,t+1. Note that
the assumption as > ap implies that the marginal product of labor is higher in the
sustainable technology as long as there is a sufficient amount of human capital to be
used. Thus, it is optimal to set `sj,t+1 = min{hj,t+1, `j,t}. Consequently, an agent’s
output is described as a function of human capital investment and labor endowment:
y(hj,t+1, `j,t) ≡ (as − ap)min{hj,t+1, `j,t}+ ap`j,t. (7)
An individual’s objective throughout his/her life is given by a lifetime utility
function,
Uj,t = ln c
y
j,t + α ln caj,t+1 + β ln bj,t+1, (8)
where cyj,t and c
a
j,t+1 denote the amount of consumption in youth and adulthood, re-
spectively, while bj,t+1 represents the amount of transfer to offspring out of altruism.13
An agent chooses the amounts of human capital investments ej,t, transfer to his/her
child bj,t+1, and the agent’s consumption schedule c
y
j,t, c
a
j,t+1 so as to maximize (8).
The maximization is done subject to human capital production (3), the nonnegativ-
ity constraint on investment ej,t ≥ 0,14 the first-period budget constraint (4), and
13The third term in (8), β ln bj,t+1, shows that we employ the joy-of-giving formulation of altruism.
Alternatively, we can replace it with β ln(1 − τ)bj,t+1 so that the parents receive utility only from
the amount of transfer net of the inheritance tax. This reformulation does not affect equilibrium
in any way because β ln(1− τ)bj,t+1 = β ln bj,t+1 + constant.
14Since the utility function satisfies the Inada conditions, the nonnegativity constraints on cyj,t
and caj,t+1 never bind in the optimal solution and therefore can be omitted. We also omit the
inequality constraint ej,t ≤ wj,t since it is equivalent to cyj,t ≥ 0 from (4).
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that of the second-period caj,t+1 + bj,t+1 = y(hj,t+1, `j,t), where function y(hj,t+1, `j,t)
is defined by (7).
This problem can be solved using the Kuhn-Tucker method as detailed in Ap-
pendix A. The optimal amount of investments in human capital is found as a function
of wj,t.
ej,t = e(wj,t) ≡



0 if wj,t ≤ w,
(α + β)(1 + α+ β)−1(wj,t − w) if wj,t ∈ (w,w),
1/γ if wj,t ≥ w,
(9)
where w ≡ ap((α+β)γ(as−ap))−1 and w ≡ as((α+β)γ(as−ap))−1+1/γ. Investments
in human capital increase with wealth because agents with insufficient wealth are
liquidity constrained. Specifically, when wj,t ≤ w agents cannot afford to invest in
human capital since consumption in youth is quite low and therefore is their first
priority. Agents with wj,t ∈ (w,w) are also liquidity constrained, but they can afford
to invest in human capital, although less than the desirable amount 1/γ.
The procedure in Appendix A also finds the optimal amount of transfer that is
left for his/her offspring as a function of wj,t and `j,t. In particular, it can be written
as bj,t+1 = b(wj,t)`j,t, where
b(wj,t) ≡



β(α + β)−1ap if wj,t ≤ w,
β(1 + α + β)−1 (ap + γ(as − ap)wj,t) if wj,t ∈ (w,w),
β(α + β)−1as if wj,t ≥ w.
(10)
The amount of transfer b(wj,t)`j,t depends on wj,t because initial wealth determines
the amount of human capital investment in youth and hence an agent’s income in
adulthood. This creates an intergenerational linkage in wealth. The dynamics of
wealth over generations are obtained by substituting this result into (2) and elimi-
nating `j,t by (1):
wj,t+1 = Qt
µ
(1− τ)b(wj,t)εj,t + τ
Z 1
0
b(wj0,t)dj
0
¶
. (11)
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Evolution of the quality of the environment
Both nature and the activity of individuals drive the evolution of the quality of
the environment Qt. The environment gradually deteriorates when people exploit
natural resources to use as an input for their primitive technology. However, natural
resources have the ability to recover their pristine abundance if exploitation ceases.15
Specifically, the change in the quality of the environment over one generation is given
by
∆Qt+1 ≡ Qt+1 −Qt = δ( eQ−Qt)− η Z 1
0
rj,t+1dj. (12)
Parameter δ ∈ (0, 1) measures the speed with which the environment recovers to-
wards pristine quality eQ. It is natural to assume that the initial level of the envi-
ronment does not exceed the pristine level; i.e., Q0 ∈ (0, eQ]. The last term of (12),
η
R 1
0
rj,t+1dj, shows that the quality of the environment deteriorates in proportion
to the aggregate amount of exploitation, where parameter η ∈ (0, 1) measures the
magnitude of this effect.
Individual usage of natural resources rj,t+1 can be found from preceding argu-
ments. From the Leontief property of primitive technology (5), rj,t+1 coincides with
labor input `pj,t+1, which is from the time constraint equal to labor endowment `j,t
less the amount used for the sustainable technology `sj,t+1. The labor input for the
sustainable technology `sj,t+1 in turn coincides with the amount of human capital
hj,t, again from the Leontief property of (6). Human capital is produced through
hj,t = γej,t`j,t as in (3), where ej,t and `j,t are respectively given by (1) and (9). In
sum, we obtain
rj,t+1 = (1− γe(wj,t))Qtεj,t. (13)
Recall that human capital investment function e(wj,t) is increasing with the
agent’s initial wealth wj,t, as shown by (9), due to credit market imperfections.
Therefore, (13) describes the tendency of poorer households to rely more on natural
resources. In particular, those with initial wealth wj,t below w do not invest in hu-
15This assumption is appropriate when we consider renewable kinds of resources, such as soil,
forests, water and atmosphere.
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man capital at all and produce goods entirely through the primitive technology that
exploits natural resources, whereas those with wj,t above w fully invest in human cap-
ital and make use of the sustainable technology without harming the environment.
Agents with wj,t ∈ (w,w) also exploit some amount of natural resources, but not
as much as poorer agents do. Interestingly, (13) also implies that, ceteris paribus,
agents utilize natural resources more when Qt is larger since better environments
make agents more active.
Aggregating (13) over agents and substituting the result into (12) gives the evo-
lution of Qt over generations:
Qt+1 = δ eQ+ µ1− δ − η + γη Z 1
0
e(wj,t)dj
¶
Qt. (14)
Equation (14) shows that the evolution of an environmental state is determined by
the average level of human capital investments, which is derived from the distribution
of wealth through the investment function (9). In the other direction, the evolution
of the distribution of wealth (11) is dependent on environmental quality since the
latter determines the ability of workers. Distribution of wealth and environmental
quality are thus interdependent so that dynamics are simultaneously determined.
The following section demonstrates that this interdependency gives rise to multiple
steady states.
3 Homogeneous Economy
As a benchmark, this section examines the working of an economy when all individ-
uals are identical in their abilities to work and in their initial wealth. Specifically,
we assume that variation in ability, defined by σ, is zero so that agents’ labor en-
dowments are given by `j,t = Qt for all j (see equation 1). If both ability and wealth
are the same across agents, they leave the same amount of wealth for their offspring.
Thus, given that agents in the initial generation start from the same amount of
wealth, wj,t’s are the same among individuals for all subsequent periods, and there-
fore can simply be written as wt. Since any redistributive policy (e.g., the inheritance
12
Figure 2: Dynamics of wealth of the representative individual. Parameters: as = 0.5,
ap = 0.3, α = 0.4, β = 0.6, γ = 6, δ = 0.3, η = 0.9, σ = 0. The values for Qt are 1 (small), 1.7
(intermediate), and 2.5 (large).
tax) has no effect in this case, the dynamics of wealth (11) simplifies to
wt+1 = b(wt)Qt. (15)
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the representative agent’s wealth wt for given
levels of Qt’s. As shown by the figure, there is an intersection between (15) and the
wt+1 = wt line. The point of intersection represents the fixed point of the dynamics,
toward which wt converges over generations. For each Qt, the fixed point is unique
since the elasticity of b(wt)Qt with respect to wt is always less than unity (see equation
10). A straightforward calculation gives the fixed point in terms of Qt,
w∗(Qt) ≡



β(α + β)−1apQt ≤ w if Qt ≤ Q,
β(α + β + 1−Qt/Q)−1apQt ∈ (w,w) if Qt ∈ (Q,Q),
β(α + β)−1asQt ≥ w if Qt ≥ Q,
(16)
where Q ≡ (βγ(as − ap))−1 and Q ≡ Q + (α + β)(βγas)−1. A larger Qt shifts the
whole schedule upward, and thus also raises w∗(Qt).
Even before analyzing the dynamics of Qt, Figure 2 and equation (16) are already
suggestive of the existence of multiple steady states. If the environment is sufficiently
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good (Qt > Q), the wealth of representative agent wt converges to a high level above
w so that everyone uses the sustainable technology, maintaining a good environment.
With a bad environment (Qt < Q), conversely, wt converges to a low level below w so
that everyone uses the primitive technology, further deteriorating their environment.
The latter situation corresponds to what we call the poverty-environment trap.
To obtain the precise nature of multiple steady states, we now examine the si-
multaneous movements of wt and Qt. From equation (14), it is straightforward to
show that Qt+1 R Qt if and only if
Qt Q Q∗(Et) ≡
δ eQ
δ + η(1− γEt)
, (17)
where Et ≡
R 1
0
e(wj,t)dj represents the aggregate amount of human capital invest-
ment. Since Et = e(wt) in the representative agent setting, substituting (9) into (17)
gives
Q∗(e(wt)) =



δ eQ±(δ + η) if wt ≤ w,
δ eQ±(δ + η¡w − w)−1(w − w)¢ if wt ∈ (w,w),eQ if wt ≥ w.
(18)
Using (16) and (18), the evolution of wealth and environmental quality is de-
scribed by the phase diagram in Figure 3, drawn in (w,Q) space. The wt+1 = wt
locus is given by wt = w
∗(Qt), whereas the Qt+1 = Qt locus is from Qt = Q
∗(e(wt)).
The figure is drawn by assuming that the pristine quality of the environment eQ is
within eQ ∈ ³Q, (1 + η/δ)Q´, (19)
for which case there exist three steady states.16 Intuitively, multiple steady states
emerge since the Qt+1 = Qt locus has an S-shape while the wt+1 = wt locus has an
16The interval in the RHS of (19) is nonempty when η/δ is large. Recall that parameters η and
δ represent the speed of the environment’s recovery and that of deterioration due to exploitation,
respectively. Therefore, multiple steady states occur only when the impacts of exploitation on the
environment are considerably stronger than its ability to recover. We consider this case throughout
the paper.
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Figure 3: Dynamics of wealth and environmental quality. The parameters are the same
as in Figure 2. There exist three steady states since assumption (19) implies δ eQ/(δ + η) < Q and
Q < eQ.
inverted S-shape. These properties derive from the upper and lower bounds of the
investments in human capital. On one hand, the Qt+1 = Qt locus is upward sloping
if an increase in wealth raises the amount of human capital investment, which occurs
only when wt ∈ (w,w). On the other hand, the slope of the wt+1 = wt locus is
flatter when wt is within (w,w) than otherwise since only in this range a change
in the environmental quality affects not only the ability of workers but also their
(descendants’) human capital investment behavior, resulting in greater variation in
the steady state wealth.
The phase diagram has two stable steady states, denoted by B (one with Qt = eQ
and wt ≥ w) and T (where Qt < Q and wt ≤ w), and one saddle point S (where
Qt ∈ (Q,Q) and wt ∈ (w,w)). There is a downward sloping saddle path, i.e., the set
of (w0, Q0) from which (wt, Qt) converges to saddle point S. However, convergence
to S is unlikely since the initial (w0, Q0) pair is given historically and therefore it is
an event of measure zero that the pair happens to be exactly on the saddle path.
The economy converges to a better steady state B if it starts from the upper
right side of the saddle path. Steady state B is better in that both wealth of the
15
representative agent and the quality of the environment are higher than the other
stable steady state T. In this steady state, the productivity of every agent is high
thanks to good environments. High productivity enables agents to leave large trans-
fers to their offspring, who use the received wealth to obtain human capital. High
levels of investment in human capital in turn contribute to maintaining good envi-
ronments because human capital enables people to adopt the sustainable technology.
This virtuous cycle makes both high wealth and good environment sustainable over
generations.
When the initial pair of (wt, Qt) is on the other side of the saddle path, the econ-
omy converges to steady state T. In contrast to steady state B, here a deteriorated
environment reduces agents’ ability to work, and also the amount of wealth that can
be left to their offspring. Agents of subsequent generations cannot afford to invest in
human capital, and have no other choice than to use the primitive technology that
exploits natural resources, and as a consequence degrade the environment more and
more. Once the economy falls into this poverty-environment trap, no one changes
their practices of environmental degradation since they are equally poor.
The last point suggests that the existence of the poverty-environment trap de-
pends on the assumption of homogeneity among agents. If we allow heterogeneity in
their ability and wealth, some relatively rich agents may be able to afford to invest in
human capital even though most agents are trapped in the vicious cycle of poverty
and bad environment. The next section examines this possibility and shows that
wealth heterogeneity is in fact the key to escaping the poverty-environment trap.
4 Economy with Heterogeneous Individuals
This section introduces heterogeneous individuals differing in their ability (i.e., in
the amount of labor endowment) and also in the initial wealth inherited from their
parents. Our first task is to establish a way to find the steady states in which both
the level of environmental quality and the distribution of wealth are stationary. Then
we examine the effect of the redistribution of wealth in the two stable steady states.
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Let Ft(w) denote the cumulative distribution function of wealth among gener-
ation t. Given Ft(w) and environmental quality Qt, equation (11) generates the
distribution of wealth among generation t+ 1. Let this process be denoted by
Ft+1(·) = TQtFt(·), (20)
where TQt is an operator that maps a wealth distribution to that of the next period
under a given level of Qt. In Appendix B, we show that Qt evolves within (0, eQ] for all
t and that for any Q ∈ (0, eQ] mapping TQ has an invariant distribution. Let us denote
by F ∗(·;Q) the cumulative distribution function of wealth that solves the functional
equation TQF
∗(·;Q) = F ∗(·;Q). Then the condition that the distribution of wealth
among agents does not change over generations is written as Ft(·) = F ∗(·;Qt).
In steady states, the quality of the environment must also be stationary. Recall
from condition (17) that this is the case if and only if Qt = Q
∗(Et), where Et
is the aggregate amount of human capital investments. The aggregate amount of
human capital investment, Et, is in turn determined by the distribution of wealth
and the individual investment function. Specifically, this relationship can be written
as Et =
R
e(w)dFt(w) ≡ E[Ft(·)], where E[·] is a functional that maps a wealth
distribution to the aggregate human capital investments.
In sum, the triple {Ft(·), Qt, Et} constitute a steady state when the following
simultaneous equations are satisfied:
Ft(·) = F ∗(·;Qt), Qt = Q∗(Et), Et = E[Ft(·)]. (21)
Although equations in (21) well describe the mutual relationship among wealth dis-
tribution, environmental quality and human capital, we need to eliminate one of them
to obtain a two-dimensional figure of the steady state. Let us eliminate Ft(w) by sub-
stituting the first equation into the RHS of the third and define E∗(Q) ≡ E[F ∗(·;Qt)].
Function E∗(Q) gives the amount of human capital investment when wealth distri-
bution is stationary under environment Qt. Using this, (21) can be simplified to
Et = E
∗(Q), Qt = Q
∗(Et). (22)
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The pair {Et, Qt} constitutes a steady state if and only if simultaneous equations
(22) are satisfied. Once such a pair is found, the stationary wealth distribution Ft(·)
can be calculated by the first equation in (21).
The advantage of the representation of steady states by (22) is that both Et and
Qt are scalar variables and therefore their relationships can be drawn as two curves in
(Et, Qt) space. We numerically calculated the curves for the conditions Et = E
∗(Q)
and Qt = Q
∗(Et), and the results are shown in Figure 4. To examine the effects of
redistribution, calculations are performed for four different rates of inheritance tax
while keeping other parameters fixed.
The upper left panel of Figure 4 shows the extreme case of τ = 1, which serves
as a benchmark. In this case all transfers from parents are expropriated by the
authority and then equally distributed among all young agents. That is, there is no
heterogeneity in wealth at birth, and, from (9), educational investment is also the
same among individuals. Thus, the steady states should coincide with ones derived
in Section 3. In fact, we see that there are three steady states; again denoted as B,
S and T. Note that the aggregate levels of human capital investment are exactly
1/γ (the maximum) and zero at steady states B and T, respectively, because the
Et = E
∗(Qt) curve is vertical at these two values. That is, when Q ≤ Q no agent
invests in human capital and therefore the Et = E
∗(Qt) curve is vertical at Et = 0.
The curve is also vertical at Et = 1/γ since all agents fully invest in human capital
whenever Qt ≥ Q.
When the magnitude of redistribution is not so large (τ < 1), the initial wealth of
agents differs, depending on their parents’ ability and wealth. In this case, the Et =
E∗(Qt) locus no longer has vertical segments because the choice of technology among
agents is not uniform. As the tax rate τ decreases, wealth distribution becomes
more heterogeneous. Then the choice of technology becomes more mixed and the
Et = E
∗(Qt) curve gets smoother. Given that the upward sloping Qt = Q
∗(Et)
curve does not depend on the degree of heterogeneity, this change implies that both
Et and Qt decreases at steady state B whereas the opposite holds at steady state T.
Although heterogeneity among individuals deteriorates the environment and reduces
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(i) τ = 1 (ii) τ = 0.5
(iii) τ = 0.3 (iv) τ = 0
Figure 4: Steady States with Heterogeneity. Parameters: as = 0.5, ap = 0.3, α = 0.4,
β = 0.6, γ = 5.8, η/δ = 2, σ = 0.7, eQ = 4. The poverty-environment trap disappears when τ ≤ 0.3.
output when the economy is in the better steady state, it mitigates environmental
degradation and poverty when the economy is in the poverty-environment trap.
Moreover, our numerical example shows that the poverty-environment trap dis-
appears when the rate of inheritance tax is below a certain threshold.17 Figure 5
illustrates the relationship between the level of τ and the steady state values of Qt.
17The threshold level of τ varies considerably depending on parameters. Under different sets of
parameters, it is possible that reductions in τ cause the better steady state to disappear before the
poverty-environment trap vanishes.
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Figure 5: Rate of inheritance tax and the steady state levels of environmental quality.
Parameters are the same as figure 4.
Thick curves represent stable steady states while the dotted curve represents a saddle
point. Arrow a shows that when the degree of wealth heterogeneity is increased by
reductions in τ to a certain extent, an economy initially in the poverty-environment
trap escapes from the trap and shifts to the better steady state. However, a further
heterogeneity in wealth in the better steady state causes environmental deterioration,
as shown by arrow b.
The result obtained in this section can be interpreted in terms of an intergener-
ational linkage in wealth and a trickle-down effect. Consider an economy trapped in
the poverty-environment trap and suppose that the heterogeneity of wealth among
agents is increased by a reduction in the rate of inheritance tax. Then, even when
the environment is bad, agents with relatively high ability may be able to leave suf-
ficient wealth for their children to afford to invest in human capital. Those receiving
sufficient wealth to invest in human capital employ the sustainable technology, which
is more productive than the primitive technology. Thus, they can leave more wealth,
giving their offspring an even greater chance to invest in human capital. In this
way, the intergenerational linkage in wealth enables fortunate households to get out
of the poverty trap. In addition, the wealth of rich households trickles down to the
poor through their adoption of the sustainable technology. As rich households switch
to the sustainable technology, the aggregate environmental load of production de-
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creases. The quality of the environment gradually improves, and the ability of every
individual increases. When redistribution is reduced considerably, even the poorest
may eventually obtain enough wealth to invest in human capital. In that case, the
shrinkage in redistribution lets the economy escape from the poverty-environment
trap to the better steady state.
However, this result is reversed if the economy is already in the better steady
state, where a majority of individuals employ the sustainable technology and the
quality of the environment is relatively good. In this case, greater inequality lets some
individuals use the primitive technology and deplete natural resources through their
production activities. These practices result in environmental degradation, which
gradually erodes the ability and wealth of every individual. Thus, redistribution of
income or wealth is desirable in this case because it not only reduces inequality but
also improves the environment and the productivity of all individuals.
5 Conclusion
We model an overlapping generation economy with heterogeneous agents, whose
ability depends on environmental quality. The relationship between wealth hetero-
geneity, the environment, and economic development are examined in that setting.
The dynamics of wealth distribution are affected by environmental quality through
the ability of agents, whereas wealth distribution affects the evolution of environmen-
tal quality through the use of primitive technology that exploits natural resources.
This interaction creates a “poverty-environment trap”, where environmental degra-
dation lowers the productivity of the poor and reduces the amount of wealth left for
their offspring, which, in turn, deprives them of the opportunity to invest in human
capital and thereby accelerates deterioration in environmental quality.
We show that increased heterogeneity in the amount of wealth at birth, resulting
from a reduction in the rate of inheritance tax, has a positive effect on both the
environment and aggregate output in a trapped economy. When relatively capable
individuals can leave a large amount of wealth, their children can employ the sus-
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tainable technology and leave more wealth to their offspring. In addition, the wealth
of fortunate households trickles down to the poor since these households’ adoption
of the sustainable technology improves environmental quality and therefore the pro-
ductivity of every individual. Accumulation of those effects may eventually enable
the economy to escape from the poverty-environment trap to a better steady state.
However, it should be noted that wide heterogeneity has a negative effect on both
the environment and aggregate output when the economy is already in the better
steady state.
Appendix
Appendix A
Using (3), we eliminate hj,t+1 from (7) to obtain
y(γej,t`j,t, `j,t) =



¡
(as − ap)γej,t + ap
¢
`j,t for ej,t ∈ [0, 1/γ],
ah`j,t for ej,t > 1/γ.
(23)
Equation (23) shows that any investment in human capital above 1/γ has no effect
on the output in the second period. Since the marginal utility of consumption in the
first period is always positive, it cannot be optimal to invest more than 1/γ.
Considering this fact, the current problem is restated as follows: to maximize (8)
with respect to cyj,t, c
a
j,t+1, ej,t and bj,t+1 under
cyj,t + ej,t = wj,t (24)
caj,t+1 + bj,t+1 =
¡
(as − ap)γej,t + ap
¢
`j,t, (25)
ej,t ≥ 0, ej,t ≤ 1/γ. (26)
The Lagrangian for this problem is
= ln cyj,t + α ln caj,t+1 + β ln bj,t+1 + λ1
£
wj,t − ccj,t − ej,t
¤
+ λ2
£¡
(as − ap)γej,t + ap
¢
`j,t − caj,t+1 − bj,t+1
¤
+ λ3ej,t + λ4 [1/γ − ej,t] .
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The first-order conditions with respect to cyj,t, c
a
j,t+1, ej,t and bj,t+1 are respectively
given by
λ1 = 1/cyj,t, (27)
λ2 = α/caj,t+1 (28)
λ2 = β/bj,t+1 (29)
−λ1 + λ2(as − ap)γ`j,t + λ3 − λ4 = 0. (30)
Since (26) is a pair of inequality constraints, complementary slackness conditions are
also required:
λ3ej,t = 0, λ3 ≥ 0, (31)
λ4[1/γ − ej,t] = 0, λ4 ≥ 0. (32)
The optimal solution is characterized by {cyj,t, caj,t+1, ej,t, bj,t+1,λ1,λ2,λ3,λ4} that solve
(24)-(32), the latter consisting of eight equality and four inequality conditions.
The solution is found by a guess-and-verify method. The first guess is that
ej,t = 0. Then from (24) and (27) λ1 = 1/cyj,t = 1/wj,t. From (25), (28) and (29)
λ2 = α/caj,t+1 = β/bj,t+1 = (α + β)/(aplj,t). From (32), λ4 = 0. Substituting λ1, λ2
and λ4 into (30) gives λ3 = 1/wj,t − (α + β)γ(as − ap)/ap. If λ3 ≥ 0, the remaining
condition (31) is also satisfied, implying that the guess ej,t = 0 is correct. This last
condition is met if and only if wj,t ≤ ap((α + β)γ(as − ap))−1 ≡ w.
The next guess is that ej,t ∈ (0, 1/γ). Then (31) and (32) show λ3 = λ4 = 0.
From (24) and (27), λ1 = 1/cyj,t = (wj,t − ej,t)−1. From (25), (28) and (29), λ2 =
α/caj,t+1 = β/bj,t+1 = (α + β)/
£
((as − ap)γej,t + ap)`j,t
¤
. Substituting λ1,λ2,λ3 and
λ4 into the remaining condition (30) gives ej,t = (α + β)(1 + α + β)−1(wj,t − w). If
the latter value is within (0, 1/γ) then our guess is correct. This is the case if and
only if w < wj,t < wj,t + (1 + α + β)(α+ β)−1γ−1 ≡ w.
Finally, we guess that ej,t = 1/γ. Then from (24) and (27) λ1 = 1/cyj,t = 1/(wj,t−
1/γ). From (25), (28) and (29) λ2 = α/caj,t+1 = β/bj,t+1 = (α + β)/(aslj,t). From
(31), λ3 = 0. Substituting λ1, λ2 and λ3 into (30) gives λ4 = −1/(wj,t − 1/γ) +
(α + β)γ(as − ap)/as. If λ4 ≥ 0, the remaining condition (32) is also satisfied,
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implying that the guess ej,t = 1/γ is correct. This last condition is met if and only
if wj,t ≥ as((α+ β)γ(as − ap))−1 + 1/γ ≡ w.
It can be confirmed that an agent with any arbitrary wj,t ≥ 0 fits (exactly) into
one of the above three cases.
Appendix B
We first prove that Qt ∈ (0, eQ] for all t ≥ 0. Since e(wj,t) ∈ [0, 1/γ] from (9),
equation (14) implies that
Qt+1 ≤ eQ− (1− δ)( eQ−Qt), (33)
Qt+1 ≥ δ( eQ−Qt) + (1− η)Qt, (34)
where δ, η ∈ (0, 1). Note that if Qt ∈ (0, eQ], then (33) and (34) gives Qt+1 ∈ (0, eQ].
Since the initial level of Qt is assumed to be within Q0 ∈ (0, eQ], by induction we
obtain Qt ∈ (0, eQ] for all t ≥ 0.
We next show that wj,t is within a bounded interval for all j and t ≥ 1. Note
that equation (10) shows b(wj,t) ∈ [(α + β)−1βap, (α + β)−1βas]. Also recall that
εj,t ∈ [1 − σ, 1 + σ] and τ ∈ [0, 1]. Substituting these and the property Qt ∈ (0, eQ]
as proved above into equation (11) gives wj,t ∈ (0,W ] for all j and t ≥ 1, where
W ≡ (α + β)−1β(1 + σ)as eQ.
Therefore, to represent the wealth distribution for t ≥ 1, it is sufficient to consider
the family of distribution on a closed and bounded (i.e., compact) interval [0,W ]. In
addition, since the number of agents in each generation is 1 for all t, we can further
restrict our attention to distributions such that F (W ) = 1. Let us denote by Λ the
family of such distributions. Then, whenever Q ∈ (0, eQ], operator TQ defined by
(20) maps Λ into itself, i.e., TQ : Λ → Λ. For later use, we order elements in Λ
by first-order dominance and denote the ordering by operator <. That is, Fa < Fb
means Fa(w) ≤ Fb(w) for all w ∈ [0,W ].
The aim of this appendix is to show that mapping TQ : Λ→ Λ has a fixed point.
The proof is based on Theorem 1 of Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992).18
18Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Owen and Weil (1998) rely on Theorem 2 of Hopenhayn and
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Theorem 1 (Hopenhayn-Prescott) Let Λ be a compact subset of (S) and T :
Λ → Λ an increasing map. Then T has a fixed point if and only if there exists a
measure µa in Λ such that Tµa < µa.
In this theorem, (S) refers to the space of finite measures on (S, ), where is
the Borel σ-algebra of subsets of S. In our context, S = [0,W ] and Λ is a closed set
of uniformly bounded measures, satisfying the requirements in Theorem 1.19 Let δ0
represent the distribution where all the mass is concentrated at 0 (i.e., δ(w) = 1 for
all w ∈ [0,W ].) Then δ0 ∈ Λ is the minimum element in Λ in that F < δ0 for all
F ∈ Λ and therefore TQδ0 < δ0.
To apply Theorem 1 for TQ, then, we only need to prove that TQ is an increasing
map. Consider two distributions of wealth Fa, Fb ∈ Λ and assume that Fa first-order
dominates Fb; i.e. Fa < Fb. By definition, TQ is an increasing map if TQFa < TQFb
for any such Fa and Fb. To show this, we use the fact that the wealth of the next
generation, given by (11), is the sum of individual transfer, Qt(1 − τ)b(wj,t)εj,t,
and the amount of redistribution, Qtτ
R 1
0
b(wj0,t)dj
0. Note that function b(wj,t) is
increasing in the previous generation’s wealth wj,t, as shown by (10), and εj,t is
distributed independently of wj,t. These imply that the distribution of individual
transfer, when the distribution of the previous generation’s wealth is given by Fa,
first-order dominates that when the distribution of the previous generation’s wealth
is Fb. In addition, the amount of redistribution is proportional to the average amount
of individual transfer, which is again higher when the distribution of the previous
generation’s wealth is Fa than when it is Fb. Thus, the distribution of wealth of the
next generation under Fa first-order dominates that under Fb; i.e., TQFa < TQFb.
We have shown that Theorem 1 can be applied for mapping TQ : Λ → Λ, which
Prescott (1992), which is simpler but requires the mapping T to be linear. Specifically, the latter
theorem is applicable when individual wealth follows an independent Markov Process since in that
case T (Fa+Fb) = TFa+TFb. This is not the case for our model, since the amount of redistribution
depends on the entire wealth distribution in the economy and therefore the evolution of individual
wealth is interrelated.
19Set Λ conforms to example (c) of Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992, p. 1390).
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assures the existence of an invariant distribution.
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